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Institutional Causes of Output Volatility
Levon Barseghyan and Riccardo DiCecio
The authors investigate the relationship between the quality of institutions and output volatility.
Using instrumental variable regressions, they address whether higher entry barriers and lower
property rights protection lead to higher volatility. They find that a 1-standard-deviation increase
in entry costs increases the standard deviation of output growth by roughly 40 percent of its average
value in the sample. In contrast, property rights protection has no statistically significant effect on
volatility. (JEL O11, O17, O43)
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quite different. Barseghyan (2008) shows that
worse property rights protection leads to lower
educational attainment and a lower capital-to-
output ratio: A lack of property rights enforcement
discourages investment in all types of capital. The
effect of property rights on total factor productivity
(TFP) is much weaker and is mostly statistically
insignificant. On the other hand, entry costs have
no effect on the capital-to-output ratio but do have
a strong effect on TFP. According to prevalent
theories of industry structure (e.g., Hopenhayn,
1992), this is exactly what should be expected:
Higher entry barriers reduce entry, protect incum-
bent firms, and allow those with lower produc-
tivity to survive. Thus, the results of our paper
suggest that differences in output volatility are
driven by industry structure, which, in turn, is
significantly affected by entry barriers. This is
consistent with the findings of Acemoglu et al.
(2003) that a significant part of the effect of insti-
tutions on economic outcomes occurs through
microeconomic channels. 
In a related paper, we explore the link between
entry costs and cross-country output and TFP
differences through the lenses of general equilib-
P
oor macroeconomic policies in less-
developed countries have been blamed
for the negative relationship between
growth and macroeconomic volatility
as measured by the volatility of the growth rate
of output per worker. Acemoglu et al. (2003) offer
a different explanation: Volatility is related to
institutional quality; once institutions are con-
trolled for, macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscal,
monetary, and exchange rate policy) have only
a minor effect on volatility. This finding raises
the question of how institutions affect output
volatility—more precisely, which institutional
features are most responsible for the relationship
documented by Acemoglu et al. (2003). We use
instrumental variable (IV) regressions to disen-
tangle the effect of two distinct types of institu-
tions: entry barriers and property rights protec-
tion. We find that higher entry barriers lead to
higher output volatility. In contrast, property
rights protection appears to have no effect on
output volatility.
Entry barriers and property rights protection
are correlated in the data, although their economic
effects, both empirically and theoretically, are
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construct a model with endogenous entry and
operation decisions by firms and calibrate it to
match the U.S. distribution of firms by size. Higher
entry costs lead to greater misallocation of produc-
tive factors and lower steady-state TFP and output.
As in the data, higher entry costs are associated
with a larger informal sector and overall number
of operating firms, a smaller number of legally
registered firms, and a higher concentration of
employment in the smallest and largest firms.
In our investigation, we use a measure of entry
costs originally constructed by Djankov et al.
(2002) and later expanded by the World Bank
(2007). Unlike most measures of institutional
quality, this is a continuous variable that captures
the precise quantitative value of the object of inter-
est. We control for property rights by considering
five proxies for property rights institutions: the rate
of debt recovery from a “going-out-of-business”
borrower, three indices of property rights protec-
tion, and a social infrastructure measure. Sources
of exogenous variation in entry costs and the prop-
erty rights measures are given by the following
instruments: geographic latitude, fraction of the
population speaking a major European language,
the country’s legal origin, European settler mortal-
ity in early stages of colonization, and indigenous
population density in the early sixteenth century,
the use of which is further explained below.
The IV regressions reveal that entry costs have
a statistically significant effect on output volatil-
ity. The economic effect of entry costs is worth
emphasizing. A 1-standard-deviation (SD) increase
in entry costs is estimated to increase the SD of
the growth rate of output per worker by 41 percent
of its average value in our sample. Also, a 1-SD
increase in entry costs increases the magnitude of
the worst output drop by 60 percent of its sample
average. We perform a variety of checks to ensure
that the estimated strong effect of entry costs on
volatility is robust. Notably, we entertain the
possibility raised by Glaeser et al. (2004) that the
defining characteristic of a successful European
settlement was an increase in human capital. We
include human capital as an endogenous variable
in the IV regressions. The robustness exercises
confirm that entry costs are an important deter-
minant of output volatility. Moreover, the magni-
tude of this effect is close to the one estimated in
the benchmark regressions. The effect of property
rights on volatility remains insignificant through-
out robustness analysis.
This paper belongs to the empirical literature
on institutions and growth, such as Hall and Jones
(1999); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002);
Acemoglu et al. (2003); Dollar and Kraay (2003);
Easterly and Levine (2003); Rodrik, Subramanian,
and Trebbi (2004); and earlier contributions by
Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995).
The empirical strategy used in the paper is clos-
est to that of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and
Barseghyan (2008). As in these papers, our analy-
sis hinges on the availability of a set of instruments
that affect current economic outcomes only
through institutions and are capable of separating
the effects of various institutional features.
Our findings suggest that entry costs, by affect-
ing the composition of the pool of firms, have an
impact on volatility. Comparably, Koren and
Tenreyro (2007) highlight the importance of the
sectorial composition in understanding the rela-
tionship between development and volatility.
Kraay and Ventura (2007) argue that comparative
advantage determines differences in the compo-
sition of firms between rich and poor countries,
making least-developed countries more volatile.
In the next section, we present the data and
methodology used in the empirical investigation.
We present the results of the empirical investiga-
tion in the following section and discuss their
robustness in the final section. The appendix
provides data sources and definitions.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Output Volatility
The benchmark measure of volatility is con-
structed using purchasing power–adjusted gross
domestic product (GDP) per worker annual data
from the Penn World Table 6.2 constructed by
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). We consider
only countries for which (i) the data for output
per worker are available for at least 20 years and
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measure of volatility is the SD of the growth rate
of output per worker. To assess the robustness of
our results, we also consider the worst output
drop (i.e., the minimum growth rate of output
per worker). For comparison, we also construct
the average growth rate for each country and
report descriptive statistics for it.
ENTRY COSTS, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE
Entry costs are from the World Bank’s Doing
Business dataset and are available for 132 coun-
tries.2 They include all official fees and dues that
an entrepreneur must pay in the process of com-
pleting legal procedures for starting a new firm.
They are constructed for a “standardized” firm.
Although this standardized firm is relatively
small, it is quite representative of a typical firm
because smaller production units have a large
share of aggregate employment.3
In most developed countries, entry costs are
not a significant burden on entrepreneurs: For
example, in Canada entrepreneurs pay less than
1 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita
in entry costs, whereas the cross-country average
is 79 percent of GNI per capita. Higher entry costs
are associated with worse macroeconomic con-
ditions along several dimensions, as shown in
Table 1 and Figures 1 through 3. Entry costs are
positively correlated with volatility and negatively
correlated with average growth. Also, higher entry
costs are associated with more severe economic
crises, measured by the worst output drop.
Finding a suitable proxy for property rights
protection is more challenging. The first variable
we use is the rate of debt recovery from a “going-
out-of-business” borrower. This is, to our knowl-
edge, the only available quantitative measure that
can proxy property rights protection. The second
variable, “constraint on executive power,” refers
to “the extent of institutionalized constraints on
the decision-making powers of chief executives,
whether individuals or collectivities” (Jaggers
and Marshall, 2000). It can be used as a proxy for
the protection of private citizens and businesses
against government expropriation. How  ever, it
may ignore the risk of expropriation by other
agents. The third variable is the property rights
protection index constructed by the Heritage
Foundation (2006). The fourth variable is the
“expropriation risk” constructed by the Political
Risk Services (1999). It measures the risk of expro-
priation of private foreign investment by the
government.4 Finally, we consider the social
infrastructure measure proposed by Hall and
Jones (1999). It was constructed as the average
between the government anti-diversion policy
index and the openness to international trade
measure of Sachs and Warner (1995). All prop-
erty rights measures and social infrastructure are
strongly positively correlated with each other and
are negatively correlated with output growth
volatility and entry costs (see Table 1).
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The target is to identify and estimate the fol-
lowing relationship:
where Yi is the volatility of output growth for
country i, Ei is the measure of entry costs, Oi is
the proxy for other institutions, Zi is the vector
Y E O Z i E i i i Z i = + + + ′ + γ γ γ γ ε 0 0 ,
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1 Notice that for different countries the volatility, average growth,
and worst output drop are computed for different time periods.
Our results are robust to the use of the same sample for all countries
(e.g., 1961-2003).
2 We consider only countries for which both volatility and entry
costs data are available.
3 In a sample of countries in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, for which harmonized firm-level
data are available, the employment share of the firms with fewer
than 50 workers is substantial—about one-third of the total. In less-
developed and developing countries, which constitute a large part
of our sample, the employment share of smaller establishments is
much larger than in developed countries—typically more than 60
percent of the total (see Tybout, 2000).
4 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use constraint on executive power,
the Heritage Foundation index, and expropriation risk to proxy for
property rights. Their preferred measure is constraint on executive
power because it conceptually refers to constraints directly imposed
on government actions. The other variables are equilibrium out-









































































Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Macro Variables, Institutions, and Moments of the Distribution of Firms
Correlations
Variables
SD of growth rate 132 6.02 4.01 1.00
Worst output drop 132 –13.23 9.64 –0.90 1.00
Average growth rate 132 1.58 1.85 –0.30 0.43 1.00
Entry costs 132 79.45 133.51 0.26 –0.32 –0.48 1.00
Debt recovery rate 132 31.97 26.59 –0.44 0.45 0.34 –0.41 1.00
Constraint on  132 4.83 1.99 –0.52 0.51 0.35 –0.40 0.51 1.00
executive power
Heritage Foundation index 112 3.20 1.11 –0.30 0.41 0.38 –0.46 0.79 0.58 1.00
Expropriation risk 59 6.52 1.51 –0.22 0.33 0.50 –0.32 0.59 0.36 0.73 1.00
Social infrastructure 117 0.51 0.49 –0.16 0.20 0.15 –0.22 0.37 0.36 0.85 0.73 1.00
Average firm size 79 3.07 1.38 0.42 –0.39 –0.30 0.23 –0.73 –0.53 –0.75 –0.64 –0.79 1.00
Variance of firm size 79 2.47 1.17 0.41 –0.41 –0.26 0.14 –0.61 –0.56 –0.65 –0.39 –0.68 0.84 1.00
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Entry Cost (percent of GNI per capita)
Standard Deviation of Per-Worker Output Growth
Figure 1
Volatility and Entry Costs: Data and Linear Fit Line (slope 1.74, p-value 0.000)









Average Per-Worker Output Growth (percent)
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Entry Cost (percent of GNI per capita)
Figure 2
Growth and Entry Costs: Data and Linear Fit Line (slope –1.01, p-value 0.000)
NOTE: Two outliers (entry costs > 500 percent of GNI) excluded.of additional controls, and εi is the error term.
An IV procedure is implemented because of poten-
tial endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and meas-
urement error. The following two assumptions
must be satisfied for an IV regression to be valid: 
(A1) The instruments must satisfy the rank 
condition 
where I denotes the vector of instruments and z
is the number of additional controls.
(A2) The instruments must be uncorrelated with
the error term, εi. 
As discussed in our results below, we test
whether these two assumptions are satisfied in
the data to corroborate our IV regression analysis. 
INSTRUMENTS
From the set of instruments available in the
literature, we use geographic latitude, the fraction
rank I Z E O Z z ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ E 1 1 3 [ ]′[ ] 


 = + ( ),
of the population speaking a major European
language, legal origin, and, for a subsample of
former colonies, European settler mortality and
indigenous population density.
The first two instruments are those used by
Hall and Jones (1999), who argued that geographic
characteristics and the extent to which major
European languages have been adopted in a coun-
try are correlated with the quality of the country’s
institutions. This is true because (i) Europeans
were more likely to settle and establish Western
institutions where the geographic characteristics
were more similar to those in their countries of
origin and (ii) the extent to which European cul-
ture and, consequently, European institutions
have spread in a country is likely to be correlated
with the adoption of European languages.
Legal origin (La Porta et al., 1999) has a strong
effect on various institutional features related to
property rights, most notably on the degree of legal
formalism, which is associated with judicial
transparency and fairness, safeguards against
corruption, and enforceability of contracts.
Barseghyan and DiCecio








Worst Output Drop (percent)
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Entry Cost (percent of GNI per capita)
Figure 3
Crises and Entry Costs: Data and Linear Fit Line (slope –4.85, p-value 0.000)
NOTE: Two outliers (entry costs > 500 percent of GNI) excluded.Settler mortality and population density,
introduced by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2003), can be used
as instruments because of their lasting effects on
countries’ institutional development. Early
European settlements were negatively affected
by high mortality rates. In places where Europeans
were settling in large numbers, it was in their
interest to promote free entrepreneurship, provide
property rights protection, and so on. Higher
indigenous population density, on the other hand,
provided Europeans with an opportunity to cap-
ture and exploit local labor, giving rise to extrac-
tive institutions and, therefore, poor property
rights protection. Higher population density
should not necessarily lead to higher entry barri-
ers. In fact, as shown in the next section, the data
reveal the opposite: Population density has a
negative effect on entry costs.
We do not use the fraction of population
speaking English or the predicted measure of
trade shares (Frankel and Romer, 1999), which
have been used by Hall and Jones (1999). Once
the five instruments previously described are con-
trolled for, these instruments have no predictive
power for entry costs or property rights measures.
Therefore, they are not relevant to our analysis.
Because of data availability, our regressions
rely on samples of different sizes. The largest
sample consists of 123 countries.
MOMENTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION
OF FIRMS BY SIZE
In Table 1, we also report statistics for the
mean and the variance of the distribution of firms
by size, based on Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk
(2009). Higher volatility is associated with a lower
density of firms (i.e., a larger average firm size)
and more heterogeneity in firm size (i.e., a higher
variance of the distribution of firms by size). The
first two moments of the distribution of firms by
size are negatively related to measures of institu-
tional quality and positively correlated with entry
costs (Figures 4 and 5).
RESULTS 
Endogenous Regressors and Instruments
As a starting point, we identify the minimum
number of instruments that allow us to separately
identify the effect of entry costs and the effect of
property rights on output volatility. Table 2 pre  -
sents the results of the ordinary least squares
regressions of the endogenous regressors on all
available instruments. In column 1, entry costs
is the dependent variable. The regressors in
columns 2 through 5 are the proxies for property
rights protection. In column 6, social infrastruc-
ture is the dependent variable.
The table shows the correlation patterns of
institutional variables with instruments; the dif-
ferences guide our initial choice of instruments.
The European languages variable has an effect on
entry costs, but no statistically significant effect
on the debt recovery rate, the Heritage Foundation
index, expropriation risk, or social infrastructure.
Legal origin has no effect on entry costs, but has
an effect on the debt recovery rate, the Heritage
Foundation index, expropriation risk, and social
infrastructure. This suggests that IV regressions
that use only the legal origin and European lan-
guages variables as instruments might achieve
identification. A natural advantage of these regres-
sions is that they do not involve population density
or settler mortality and therefore can be imple-
mented on the full sample rather than the sub-
sample of former colonies.
Population density has the expected negative
effect on property rights measures and social
infrastructure, but its effect on entry costs has the
wrong sign.5 Settler mortality has the expected
negative effect on all endogenous regressors.
Neither of these variables has a statistically sig-
nificant effect on constraint on executive power.
Because the latter is correlated with the European
languages variable and latitude, we consider IV
regressions that use population density, settler
mortality, and the European languages variables
(or latitude) as instruments.
In each of the following IV regressions, we
formally test whether the rank condition (A1) is
Barseghyan and DiCecio
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5 That is, higher population density implies lower entry barriers.Barseghyan and DiCecio
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Figure 4
Average Firm Size and Entry Costs: Data and Linear Fit Line (slope 0.74, p-value 0.001)









Variance of Employment (log)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Entry Cost (percent of GNI per capita)
Figure 5
Variance of Firm Size and Entry Costs: Data and Linear Fit Line (slope 0.55, p-value 0.001)
NOTE: Two outliers (entry costs > 500 percent of GNI) excluded.satisfied. In addition, when the number of
instruments exceeds the number of endogenous
regressors, we perform a test for overidentifying
restrictions.
RESULTS
Our preliminary regressions are carried out
with two instruments: the legal origin and
European languages variables. The results of these
regressions are reported in columns 1 through 3
of Table 3. In the regressions reported in column
1, property rights are proxied by the debt recovery
rate, in column 2 by the Heritage Foundation
index, and in column 3 by social infrastructure.
We report three numbers for each instrumented
variable: the coefficient, the heteroskedasticity
robust standard error (SE), and the corresponding
p-value. (To save space, the intercept is not
reported.) We also report the p-value of the
Cragg-Donald insufficient rank test (see Cragg
and Donald, 1993). The null of this test is that
the rank is insufficient. The rejection of the test
provides confidence that the rank condition (A1)
is satisfied. The number of observations is reported
last.
As columns 1 through 3 show, entry costs
have a statistically significant adverse effect on
volatility. However, the null of the Cragg-Donald
Barseghyan and DiCecio
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Table 2
Assessing Instruments: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Endogenous Regressors on
Instruments
Endogenous regressors
Constraint on  Heritage 
Debt  executive   Foundation  Expropriation  Social 
Entry costs  recovery rate  power index  risk  infrastructure 
Instruments (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Latitude –126.13 31.03 2.77 1.74 1.71 0.02
(99.63) (20.03) (1.19) (0.70) (1.20) (0.21)
0.21 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.93
European languages –115.55 –2.20 2.55 0.29 0.42 0.00
(40.97) (9.43) (0.50) (0.28) (0.38) (0.06)
0.01 0.82 0.00 0.31 0.27 0.96
British legal origin 0.43 11.59 0.31 0.63 0.77 0.07
(65.94) (5.14) (0.35) (0.18) (0.34) (0.04)
0.99 0.03  0.38 0.00 0.03 0.10
Log population density –19.44 –2.81 –0.05 –0.18 –0.19 –0.05
(9.12) (1.99) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11) (0.01)
0.04 0.16 0.74 0.02 0.09 0.00
Log settler mortality 53.19 –6.69 –0.11 –0.15 –0.30 –0.06
(26.92) (2.07) (0.17) (0.08) (0.16) (0.02)
–0.05 0.00 0.54 0.08 0.07 0.00
Observations 61 61 60 58 61 61
R2 0.25 0.46 0.56 0.60 0.41 0.52
NOTE: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with corresponding p-values listed below. See the appendix for data
sources and definitions.test is rejected in only one regression,6 implying
that the instruments are not well suited to sepa-
rately identify the effect of entry costs and prop-
erty rights. For robustness, we also report the
results of these regressions when latitude is used
as an instrument instead of European languages
(columns 4 through 6). While the results are sim-
ilar to those reported in columns 1 through 3,
the p-values of the entry costs coefficient and of
the Cragg-Donald test are larger. This is expected
given that neither legal origin nor latitude is
strongly correlated with entry costs.
Our benchmark regressions use three instru-
ments: settler mortality, population density, and
European languages. Columns 1 through 5 of
Table 4 show the results for all five proxies of
property rights protection. The effect of entry
costs in all these regressions is negative and sta-
tistically significant. Its magnitude is close to
that reported in Table 3. Neither property rights
nor social infrastructure has a statistically signif-
icant effect in any of these regressions. The null
of the Cragg-Donald test is rejected once at the 1
percent level, twice at the 5 percent level, and
twice at the 10 percent level. The null of the
Hansen-Sargan overidentification test,7 which is
that the exclusion restriction (A2) holds, is not
rejected in any of these regressions. This lends
credibility to the validity of the instruments.
Columns 6 through 10 of Table 4 repeat these
regressions but use latitude rather than European
languages as an instrument. The results of these
regressions are similar to those in columns 1
through 5, but as indicated by the p-values of
the Cragg-Donald test, this set of instruments is
weaker.
6 The regressions with constraint on executive power and expro-
priation risk are not reported, because their p-values of Cragg and
Donald’s test are very high.
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Table 3
Instrumental Variable Regressions of Standard Deviation of Growth Rate of Output Per Worker
on Entry Costs and a Measure of Property Rights
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of growth rate
Instruments:  Instruments: 
Legal origin and European languages Legal origin and latitude
Heritage Heritage
Debt  Foundation Social  Debt  Foundation  Social 
recovery rate index  infrastructure   recovery rate  index  infrastructure 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entry costs 1.64 1.68 1.53 1.56 1.10 1.14
(0.58) (0.77) (1.53) (0.94) (1.00) (0.62)
0.00 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.07
Measure of property rights –0.03 –0.56 –2.95 –0.03 –0.59 –3.56
(0.01) (0.40) (1.33) (0.02) (0.54) 1.33
0.05 0.16 0.03 0.19 0.28 0.01
Insufficient rank 0.07 0.20 0.23 0.36 0.35 0.29
Observations 121 110 113 123 111 113
NOTE: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with corresponding p-values listed below. See the appendix
for data sources and definitions.
7 The Economic Significance of Entry Barriers. See Sargan (1958)









































































Instrumental Variable Regressions of Standard Deviation of Growth Rate of Output Per Worker on Entry Costs and a
Measure of Property Rights
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of growth rate
Instruments:  Instruments: 
Settler mortality, population density, and European languages Settler mortality, population density, and latitude
Constraint on Heritage  Debt  Constraint on Heritage 
Debt  executive  Foundation  Expropriation  Social  recovery  executive Foundation  Expropriation  Social 
recovery rate  power index  risk  infrastructure  rate  power index  risk  infrastructure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Entry costs 1.47 2.03 1.64 1.62 1.61 2.17 1.93 1.91 2.07 2.04
(0.62) (0.85) (0.71) (0.66) (0.63) (0.94) (0.79) (0.89) (0.85) (0.78)
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
Measure of property  –0.01 0.29 –0.02 –0.04 –0.30 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.25 1.51
rights
(0.03) (0.28) (0.45) (0.40) (1.89) (0.04) (0.26) (0.47) (0.46) (2.29)
0.60 0.29 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.60 0.80 0.66 0.60 0.51
Insufficient rank 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.43 0.08 0.11 0.24 0.05
Overidentification 0.25 0.57 0.85 0.23 0.23 0.62 0.61 0.98 0.61 0.72
Observations 59 58 56 59 59 59 58 56 59 59
NOTE: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with corresponding p-values listed below. See the appendix for data sources and definitions.THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
OF ENTRY BARRIERS
The results previously described suggest that
entry barriers have a significant effect on output
volatility. The average value of the entry costs
coefficient in the 10 regressions in Table 4 is 1.85.
This implies that a 1-SD increase in entry costs
in our sample results in a 2.5-percentage-point
increase in the SD of the growth rate of output,
which is roughly 41 percent of its mean value in
our sample.
Entry Costs and Industry Structure
A structural interpretation of our results
relies on the seminal work of Hopenhayn (1992).
Costlier entry leads to less competition and a lower
number of operating firms. With the protection
from potential entrants afforded by high entry
costs, low-productivity firms can survive and
operate. This implies that operating firms are
more heterogeneous—that is, a higher dispersion
of firm productivity.8 This mechanism magnifies
the volatility stemming from aggregate uncertainty.
In the data, the lower density of operating firms
and the higher heterogeneity in firm size are
associated with higher macroeconomic volatility
(Figures 4 and 5). Unfortunately, the paucity of
data prevents us from analyzing directly the
empirical relationship between entry costs and
industry structure in this paper. We leave this
task for future research.
Robustness
The effect of entry costs on output volatility
is statistically and economically significant, and
this result is not driven by an omission of human
capital, corruption, or business regulation from
the regressions. Moreover, the instruments do not
have an independent effect on output volatility,
especially those correlated with entry costs. Once
entry costs are controlled for, property rights
appear to have no effect on output volatility.9
While we found no indication that an omitted
endogenous regressor biases the results, it is pos-
sible that entry costs and property rights capture
the effect of other institutions that are correlated
with the instruments and affect output volatility.
If this were the case, our results should be inter-
preted as strong evidence for the existence of a
set of institutions that are distinct from those
related to property rights and that affect output
volatility. Entry costs should be viewed as a good
proxy for this set of institutions.
Other Volatility Measures
We also investigate whether entry costs affect
the magnitude of economic downturns.10 In
Table 5, we perform regressions identical to those
in Table 4, except the outcome of interest is the
worst drop in output, which is computed as the
minimum growth rate of output per worker.
The results of these regressions are in accord
with our previous findings: Entry costs have a
strong effect on the severity of economic crises
in all regressions; property rights protection does
not have a significant effect in any regression.
The null of the Cragg-Donald test is not rejected
(at the 10 percent level) in 7 of the 10 regressions.
The null of the overidentification test is not
rejected in any regression.
The magnitude of the effect of entry costs on
the severity of an economic crisis is very large.
The average value of the entry costs coefficient
in the 10 regressions in Table 5 is 5.93. This implies
that a 1-SD increase in entry costs increases the
magnitude of the worst output drop by about 60
percent of its mean value in our sample.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the reasons behind cross-
country differences in economic outcomes remains
a primary goal of economics. Although recent
advances in the literature have identified insti-
tutions as major determinants of economic out-
comes, little is known about the role and relative
8 See Barseghyan and DiCecio (2010) for a derivation of this result
in a general equilibrium setting.
9 Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009) report the regression tables
(Tables 3C-3E and 4-7B) of these robustness checks. 
Barseghyan and DiCecio
216 MAY/JUNE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
10 Our results are also robust to the use of the range of the growth
rate of output per worker as a measure of volatility. The correspond  -









































































Instrumental Variable Regressions of Largest Drop of Output Per Worker on Entry Costs and a Measure of Property Rights
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of growth rate
Instruments:  Instruments: 
Settler mortality, population density, and European languages Settler mortality, population density, and latitude
Constraint on Heritage  Debt  Constraint on Heritage 
Debt  executive Foundation  Expropriation  Social  recovery  executive Foundation  Expropriation  Social 
recovery rate  power  index  risk  infrastructure  rate  power  index  risk  infrastructure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Entry costs –4.21 –6.57 –5.08 –4.89 –4.82 –7.35 –6.23 –6.76 –6.82 –6.59
(1.94) (2.78) (2.29) (2.16) (2.01) (3.42) (2.63) (3.04) (3.08) (2.64)
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01
Measure of property  0.05 –1.30 0.15 0.01 0.56 –0.10 –0.54 –1.31 –1.24 –6.86
rights
(0.08) (1.02) (1.56) (1.31) (6.14) (0.14) (1.01) (1.82) (1.79) (8.23)
0.51 0.20 0.93 1.00 0.93 0.47 0.59 0.47 0.49 0.40
Insufficient rank 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.43 0.08 0.11 0.24 0.05
Overidentification 0.18 0.44 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.66 0.56 0.97 0.65 0.80
Observations 59 58 56 59 59 59 58 56 59 59
NOTE: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with corresponding p-values listed below. See the appendix for data sources and definitions.importance of specific institutions. We find that
entry regulation is an important determinant of
output volatility, while property rights protection
is not. These results strengthen the view that entry
costs are an important institutional feature and
that the effect of institutions on the economy
occurs through their impact on industry structure
(see, e.g., Nickell, 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2003;
Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Bastos and Nasir,
2004; Sivadasan, 2009; Alesina et al., 2005; Bruhn,
2008; Djankov, Ganser et al., 2010; Barseghyan,
2008).
For policymakers seeking well-defined strate-
gies to stabilize the economies of less-developed
countries, our paper provides an additional argu-
ment for the elimination of entry barriers: The
estimated effect of such a policy is a sizable
decrease in output volatility.
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Entry Costs (The World Bank, 2004, 2005, 2006a,b, 2007)11
Entry costs are constructed for “a ‘standardized’ firm which has the following characteristics: 
(1) it performs general industrial or commercial activities, it operates in the largest city (by population),
(2) it is exempt from industry-specific requirements (including environmental ones), it does not partici-
pate in foreign trade and does not trade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (e.g., liquor, tobacco, gas),
it is a domestically-owned limited liability company, (3) its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind
contributions) and is the higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) the minimum capital require-
ment for the particular type of business entity, it rents (i.e., does not own) land and business premises,
it has between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commencement of operations, all of whom are
nationals, it has turnover of up to 10 times its start-up capital, and it does not qualify for investment
incentives.”
Debt Recovery Rate (The World Bank, 2004, 2005, 2006a,b, 2007)
The recovery rate is recorded as cents on the dollar recovered by claimants’ creditors, tax authorities,
and employees through the bankruptcy proceedings. The calculation takes into account whether the
business is kept as a going concern during the proceedings, as well as bankruptcy costs and the loss in
value due to the time spent closing down.
Purchasing Power Parity–Adjusted GDP Per Worker (Center for International Comparisons of
Production, Income and Prices, University of Pennsylvania—Penn World Table 6.2)12
Constraint on Executive Power (Polity IV Project, Jaggers and Marshall, 2000)13
This variable “refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of
chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities,” and takes values from 1 to 7, where 1 = unlimited
authority; 3 = slight to moderate limitations; 5 = substantial limitations; and 7 = executive parity
(between the executive(s) and accountability groups) or subordination. For more details, see the Polity
IV Project manual.
Property Rights Protection Index (Based on the Heritage Foundation’s 2006 Index of Economic Freedom
dataset)14
From 1 to 5 (in the regressions, the scale is reversed, e.g., 5 = 1 and 1 = 5):
1. Private property guaranteed by government; court system efficiently enforces contracts; justice
system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property; corruption nearly nonexistent,
and expropriation highly unlikely.
2. Private property guaranteed by government; court system suffers delays and is lax in enforcing
contracts; corruption possible but rare; expropriation unlikely.
3. Court system inefficient and subject to delays; corruption may be present; judiciary may be
influenced by other branches of government; expropriation possible but rare.
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11 Available at www.doingbusiness.org/.
12 Available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
13 Available at www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
14 Available at www.heritage.org/Index/.4. Property ownership weakly protected; court system inefficient; corruption present; judiciary
influenced by other branches of government; expropriation possible.
5. Private property outlawed or not protected; almost all property belongs to the state; country in
such chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that property protection nonexistent; judiciary
so corrupt that property not effectively protected; expropriation frequent.
The index is constructed based on the following factors: (i) freedom from government influence
over the judicial system; (ii) commercial code defining contracts; (iii) sanctioning of foreign arbitration
of contract disputes; (iv) government expropriation of property; (v) corruption within the judiciary;
(vi) delays in receiving judicial decisions and/or enforcement; and (vii) legally granted and protected
private property.
Protection Against Expropriation Risk (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001)
Risk of expropriation of private foreign investment, from 0 to 10. Higher score means less risk.
Original source: Political Risk Services (September 1999).
Social Infrastructure (Hall and Jones, 1999)
Hall and Jones constructed this measure as an average of the openness to trade index and the
Government Anti-Diversion Policies (GADP) index. The openness to trade index was taken from Sachs
and Warner (1995). The GADP index is an equal-weighted average of five indices: (i) law and order,
(ii) bureaucratic quality, (iii) corruption, (iv) risk of expropriation, and (v) government repudiation of
contracts. All of these were taken from Political Risk Services.
European Settler Mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001)
Estimated mortality for European settlers during the early period of European colonization (before
1850).
Population Density in 1500 (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002)
Indigenous population density in 1500, indicated as inhabitants per square kilometer.
Fraction of Population Speaking a Major European Language (Hall and Jones, 1999, based on
Gunnemark, 1991, and Hunter, 1992)
Latitude (La Porta et al., 1999)
The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to values between 0 and 1. Original source:
CIA World Factbook.
Government Corruption Variable (La Porta et al., 1999)
“Low ratings indicate ￿‘high government officials are likely to demand special payments’ and ￿‘illegal
payments are generally expected through lower levels of government’ in the form of bribes connected
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.” Scale
0 to 10. Average value over 1972-95. Original source: International Country Risk Guide, produced by
Political Risk Services; www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx.
Business Regulation (La Porta et al., 1999)
This index ranges from 1 to 5. The index is constructed based on the following factors: (i) licensing
requirements to operate a business; (ii) ease of obtaining a business license; (iii) corruption within the
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222 MAY/JUNE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWbureaucracy; (iv) labor regulations, such as established workweeks, paid vacations, and parental leave,
as well as selected labor regulations; (v) environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations;
and (vi) regulations that impose a burden on business. Original source: The Heritage Foundation’s Index
of Economic Freedom dataset (2006). 
Moments of the Distribution of Employment by Size Class Across Countries (Alfaro, Charlton, and
Kanczuk, 2009)
These data are constructed from microdata collected in Dun & Bradstreet’s WorldBase. The unit of
observation is the plant.
For our cross-sectional study, only one observation is needed for each of the variables above. For
entry costs and the debt recovery rate, we take the average over the five years (2004-08) for which data
are available. For the constraint on executive power variable and the property rights index, we average
over the last 10 years in which they were reported: 1994-2003 and 1996-2005, respectively. For the
expropriation risk variable, we use the average over 1985-1995.
Ideally, the averages over the same period of time for all variables would be used. Unfortunately,
this is not possible because of data limitations. For some countries data for one or more years might be
missing. We ignore these years when constructing averages.15
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15 When constructing the averages for constraint on executive power, interregnum and transitional periods are ignored, except for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa). Because all years between 1994 and 2003 were classified as interregnum or transitional for this country,
we use the value for year 1991, the last year for which constraint on executive power was recorded.224 MAY/JUNE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW